The main theme is that theorizing serves empirical prediction. This is used as the core of a counter to contemporary anti-realist arguments. Different versions of the thesis that data underdetermines theory are identified and it is shown that none which are acceptable differentiates between theory selection and prediction. Criteria sufficient for the former are included amongst those necessary for the latter; and obviously go beyond mere compatibility with data.Special attention is given to causal process theories. It is argued that the (...) only empirically equivalent alternatives which can be constructed to any theory of this kind must be parasitic on that theory; so a choice for the original theory can not be avoided. Once this is established, a positive case for taking a realist position can be developed. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt at a vindication of induction. The point of departure is that induction requires a justification and that the only kind of justification possible is a vindication. However traditional vindications of induction have rested on unjustified assumptions about the aim of induction. This vindication takes the end pursued in induction simply to be correct prediction. It is argued that induction is the only reasonable way of pursuing this end because induction is the only objective method of (...) predicting. While objectivity is not a necessary condition for successful predicting, it is a sufficient condition for the possession of a property that is, in turn, a necessary condition for correct predicting; and further there could be no reason to expect any non-objective method to possess this necessary condition for success. Induction is the only objective method of predicting for it alone uses facts which must be identified by any predicting method based on rules; and it alone uses these facts according to a relationship that must hold between facts and any meaningful empirical statement. Any alternative to induction must assume that the factual regularities that have been detected will alter in the future and the way they are expected to alter must be arbitrary. It is further claimed that this vindication is proof against the criticisms that have been advanced against practicalist justifications of induction. (shrink)

Reichenbach held that all scientific inference reduces, via probability calculus, to induction, and he held that induction can be justified. He sees scientific knowledge in a practical context and insists that any rational assessment of actions requires a justification of induction. Gaps remain in his justifying argument; for we can not hope to prove that induction will succeed if success is possible. However, there are good prospects for completing a justification of essentially the kind he sought by showing that while (...) induction may succeed, no alternative is a rational way of trying.Reichenbach's claim that probability calculus, especially via Bayes' Theorem, can help to exhibit the structure of inference to theories is a valuable insight. However, his thesis that the weighting of all hypotheses rests only on frequency data is too restrictive, especially given his scientific realism. Other empirical factors are relevant. Any satisfactory account of scientific inference must be deeply indebted to Reichenbach's foundation work. (shrink)

Arguments are weakly meta-argumentative when they call attention to themselves and purport to be successful as arguments. Arguments are strongly metaargumentative when they take arguments (themselves or other arguments) as objects for evaluation, clarification, or improvement and explicitly use concepts of argument analysis for the task. The ambitious meta-argumentation thesis is that all argumentation is weakly argumentative. The modest meta-argumentation thesis is that there are unique instances of strongly meta-argumentative argument. Here, we show how the two theses are connected and (...) both are plausible. (shrink)

The paper proposes an explication of causation in terms of laws and their explanatory systematization. A basic notion is "nomic dependence". The definition given by David Lewis is suitable for deterministic laws, and a general definition drawing on Wesley Salmon's statistical-relevance model of explanation is proposed. A test is offered for establishing that one chain of nomically dependent events is more direct than another that ends with the same event by considering the relationship between the two chains when an explanation (...) in terms of more basic laws is sought. The chain to an event can be defined as causal if it is the most direct nomically linked chain leading up to that event. (shrink)

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin challenged theology to reach for an understanding of God that would take into account the reality of evolution. Paul Tillich's notion of New Being goes a long way toward meeting this challenge, and a theology of evolution can gain a great deal from Tillich's religious thought. But Teilhard would still wonder whether the philosophical notion of being, even when qualified by the adjective new, is itself adequate to contextualize evolution theologically. To Teilhard a theology attuned to (...) a post–Darwinian world requires nothing less than a revolution in our understanding of what is ultimately real. It is doubtful that Tillich's rather classical theological system is radical enough to accommodate this requirement. For Teilhard, on the other hand, a metaphysics grounded in the biblical vision, wherein God is understood as the future on which the world rests as its sole support, can provide a more suitable setting for evolutionary theology. (shrink)

The Homeric Hymns are commonly taken to be religious poems in some general sense but they are often said to contrast with cult hymns in that the latter have a definite ritual function, whereas "literary" hymns do not. This paper argues that despite the difficulty in establishing a precise occasion of performance for the Homeric Hymns, we are nevertheless in a position to identify their ritual function: by intoning a Hymn of this kind, the singer achieves the presence of a (...) god before participants in a public festival. The key mechanism by which the hymnist does this is the evocation of a god via the elaboration of a typical unit of traditional hymnic discourse, what I call the "theme of recognition ." The pragmatic operation of narrative such as this is similar to the device known in the study of magical texts as the historiola, or short narrative that serves as a verbal model for a desired outcome in the patient's world. This kind of operation is called, in this paper, "symbolic action," a term borrowed from the rhetorician Kenneth Burke. The theme of recognition is traced in the fabric of the expansive Hymns , and the paper further argues that an important generic marker in the Hymns, the greeting of the god , discloses their pragmatic function, the hymnist's skillful deliverance of the god before his hearers. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2015 Heft: 207 Seiten: 185-200.

Having taught management ethics for several years, I have been repeatedly frustrated by the practical mismatch between management problems and moral philosophy…. Unless we can connect ethical theory more closely with management practice, we may be dressing our business curriculum windows with philosophical finery but failing to meet the urgent need for clarity of thought in management ethics.

No healthcare issue has generated as much ethical debate on the relationship between the individual and society as HIV Infection. In this debate, an appeal is most often made to such principles as autonomy and confidentiality to protect individuals who are HIV positive or who have AIDS from an invasion of privacy thought to be justified by society's need for information. In the first years, this emphasis on the protection of the individual was essential. Even today, there are risks in (...) disclosing one's HIV status. However, as more and more persons become Infected, live longer, and move within the healthcare industry for non-HIV related care, as both patients and healthcare workers, the terms of the debate need to be redefined. (shrink)

D. Z. Phillips holds that we cannot ask a general philosophical question about the existence of God because we discover what it means for God to exist only from within particular linguistic contexts, especially those of prayer and worship. This raises the suspicion that God’s existence therefore depends on a particular language-use, as does the existence of cultural objects like prices or the equator. The article suggests that Phillips’s position overlooks the peculiar status of other persons in our discourse, and (...) the part they play in establishing a basic sense of “existence.” Closer consideration of this aspect of our language-use can take us beyond the limits of Phillips’s approach, and reopen the question of God’s existence in a strong sense. (shrink)

Jaynes's maximum entropy principle (MEP) is analyzed by considering in detail a recent controversy. Emphasis is placed on the inductive logical interpretation of “probability” and the concept of “total knowledge.” The relation of the MEP to relative frequencies is discussed, and a possible realm of its fruitful application is noted.

Contemporary Perspectives in Critical and Social Philosophy brings together a range of essays concerning ways of conceptualising modernities, subjectivities, and recognition. It highlights recent developments in German critical and social philosophy and includes essays by Martin Seel, Christoph Menke, Max Pensky, Andrew Bowie, and Karl Ameriks, and critical discussions of the works of Manfred Frank, Theodor Adorno and Axel Honneth.

Frank Jackson's criticisms have helped me recognize some of the weaknesses in my proposed vindication of induction. The core of the argument I offered was that induction is the only method of predicting which is based in a nonarbitrary way on the facts. I still believe that this is so and that because of this property induction is the only reasonable way of predicting. However I now recognize defects in the argument by which I attempted to establish that the uniqueness (...) of this property to induction constitutes its justification. (shrink)

Evolutionary biology has considerably altered our understanding of life, and it now promises to enhance our understanding of human existence by providing new insights into the meaning of intelligence, ethical aspiration and religious life. For some scientific thinkers, especially those who espouse a physicalist worldview, Darwin’s science seems so impressive that it now replaces theology by providing the deepest available explanation of all manifestations of life, including human intelligence. By focusing on human intelligence this essay asks whether a theological perspective (...) on the universe can still have an illuminating role to play alongside of biology (and other scientific perspectives) in contemporary attempts to understand human intelligence. (shrink)

Ten tekst przedstawia trzy różne sposoby, w jakie ludzie, którzy mieli kontakt z nauką, odpowiadają na następujące pytania: „Czy nauka jest zgodna z wiarą religijną?” oraz „Czy nauka nie wyklucza istnienia osobowego Boga?”. Pierwsza odpowiedź zakłada, że nauki przyrodnicze i wiara religijna wykluczają się wzajemnie. To jest sytuacja konfliktu. Jej przedstawiciele należą do dwóch głównych podgrup: sceptyków, którzy wierzą, że nauki przyrodnicze uczyniły wszystkie twierdzenia religijne niewiarygodnymi, oraz ludzi wiary, którzy odmawiają przyjęcia pewnych naukowych idei, takich jak kosmologia Wielkiego Wybuchu (...) i ewolucja biologiczna. W obecnym tekście konflikt dotyczy tylko naukowych sceptyków, którzy twierdzą, że metody i odkrycia naukowe zdezaktualizowały wiarę religijną i teologię. Drugi typ odpowiedzi na wymienione pytania utrzymuje, że nauka i wiara dotyczą różnych poziomów lub wymiarów rzeczywistości. Zgodnie z tym podejściem, nauka i teologia stawiają zupełnie inne rodzaje pytań, dlatego nie można ich traktować jako konkurencyjnych obszarów. W stanowisku kontrastu podkreśla się, że nie może być prawdziwego konfliktu między twierdzeniami nauk przyrodniczych a twierdzeniami wiary i teologii. Wiara i nauka nie rywalizują o jakiś wspólny cel, więc nie mogą wchodzić ze sobą w konflikt. Trzecim stanowiskiem jest konwergencja. Można je również nazwać „współbrzmieniem”, „współpracą”, „kontaktem” lub „konwersacją”. To stanowisko zgadza się z tezą „kontrastu”, według którego wiara religijna i nauki przyrodnicze są różnymi sposobami rozumienia świata, ale argumentuje zarazem, że te dwa obszary nieuchronnie oddziałują na siebie. Konwergencja promuje tę interakcję. Celem zwolenników konwergencji jest osiągnięcie syntezy, w której zarówno nauka, jak i wiara zachowują swoją tożsamość, a jednocześnie pozostają w ścisłym związku ze sobą we wspólnym dążeniu do inteligibilności i prawdy. Konwergencja zakłada, że odkrycia naukowe mają znaczenie dla wiary, innymi słowy, odkrycia naukowe mogą znacząco wpłynąć na to, jak myślimy o Bogu i sensie naszego życia. Konwergencja zakłada, że nauka i wiara, o ile nie są ze sobą mylone, mogą razem prowadzić do bogatszego spojrzenia na rzeczywistość. (shrink)

Evolutionary biology has considerably altered our understanding of life, and it now promises to enhance our understanding of human existence by providing new insights into the meaning of intelligence, ethical aspiration and religious life. For some scientific thinkers, especially those who espouse a physicalist worldview, Darwin’s science seems so impressive that it now replaces theology by providing the deepest available explanation of all manifestations of life, including human intelligence. By focusing on human intelligence this essay asks whether a theological perspective (...) on the universe can still have an illuminating role to play alongside of biology (and other scientific perspectives) in contemporary attempts to understand human intelligence. (shrink)

Evolutionary biology has considerably altered our understanding of life, and it now promises to enhance our understanding of human existence by providing new insights into the meaning of intelligence, ethical aspiration and religious life. For some scientific thinkers, especially those who espouse a physicalist worldview, Darwin’s science seems so impressive that it now replaces theology by providing the deepest available explanation of all manifestations of life, including human intelligence. By focusing on human intelligence this essay asks whether a theological perspective (...) on the universe can still have an illuminating role to play alongside of biology in contemporary attempts to understand human intelligence. (shrink)

Brings the thought and theology of Teilhard de Chardin into conversation with other significant religious thinkers, philosophers, and scientists.